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Abstract
Recent studies suggest that the allocation of expenditures in education matters for
growth. Public education spending in many transition economies, however, is often
inefficient and inequitable with education outlays misallocated across sectors. This
highlights the need for an assessment of the nature of education expenditures in these
countries. This paper attempts to fill the gap in the literature by estimating the
determinants of education expenditures in the Russian Federation. Results from panel
data analysis show that revenue and the student-population ratio have a positive impact
on education expenditures while the effect of population density is negative. Three
regional variables also show significant impact. The income and price elasticity of
education expenditures are estimated to be 0.56 and –0.47, respectively and is
comparable to studies from other countries. The results presented here raise questions
about how fiscal institutions and the structure of the political process in Russia may
affect the degree of resource allocation in the educational sector during the transition
process.
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11 Introduction
The thrust of systematic transformation in the post-Soviet Russian economic and social
system has been to bring about the transition from an administrative government
economic management system to a market-oriented economy with regulatory
government functions. As expected, many features of the new economic system are not
yet clarified and the forms of economic organization – both in private and, especially, in
public goods production – are still being debated (Hare and Lugachyov 1999).
Consequently, various issues relating to the public and private financing of social sector
activities, the public and private provision of social services, and the limits and
effectiveness of privatization in the social sector have generated keen interest among
both academicians and policy makers.
In this context, a vocal debate on public education finance reform has been evident in
the public policy circles. The Soviet educational system, with broad access, and high
levels of scholarly achievement, had long been a source of strength. However, it failed
to adapt to the rapidly changing economic environment following the market-oriented
transition beginning in the early 1990s. During this period, Russia has experimented
with rapid decentralization attempts and implemented changes in primary education,
fiscal decentralization in the education sector, diversification at the secondary level, and
expansion of higher education. These rapid decentralization attempts have not been well
designed, since there has been no commensurate transfer of resources and the levels of
budget responsibility have remained unclear (Canning et al. 1999). These reforms have
led to a mixture of successes and challenges that are worth analyzing as they provide
valuable information regarding the future of the system.
There is a general consensus in the literature that expansion in the skills, knowledge,
and capacities of individuals – increasing human capital – is critical for economic
growth (Dabla-Norris and Matovu 2002).1 Education plays a key role in creating human
capital. Thus the high estimated rates of return to schooling is often cited as justification
for increased public investment in more and better quality schools.2 At the same time,
given budgetary constraints, many countries face important tradeoffs between education
and other types of expenditures, such as, domestic infrastructure. For example, fiscal
austerity programmes often make it necessary for countries to take difficult choices
regarding which components of public expenditures should be reduced or reallocated
within the overall budget. This is true for a transition economy like Russia where acute
financial constraints force the government to make critical, and sometimes unpopular,
choices.
Baqir (2002) has shown that countries at similar levels of economic development vary
considerably in how much their governments spend on the education sector. The value
of education spending also changes within countries over time. Given this significant
variation in education spending across and within countries, a natural question arises as
1 See Barro and Lee (2000) for a cross-country study emphasizing the importance of education for
economic growth.
2 Judson (1998) reports that countries whose allocation are inefficient gain little in output and growth
from their investments in education.
2to what factors help to explain this difference. This issue is interesting from a public
policy perspective as spending on education has significant positive redestributive effect
and because it raises the human capital of the economy, which can lead to direct growth
effects (Barro 1991) and indirect spillover benefits for the rest of the economy (Baqir
2002). Despite the importance of this issue for the transition economies, there is
surprisingly little formal theoretical or empirical work.
This is one of the first studies that we are aware of that tackles this issue in public policy
economics with the realistic expectation of obtaining results comparable in quality and
reliability to those available in developed countries. The paper fills a gap in the
literature by conducting an empirical analysis of the determinants of public expenditures
on the general education system in Russia. General education is selected as the demand
function (or household preferences) for this type of education is more complicated and
diverse but at the same time less well-known than those of the other types of education,
such as, graduate and post-graduate. Moreover, greater opportunities of labour market
success and earning potentials in Russia have increased the returns to acquired
education. This has reinforced the importance of general education, which involves
mostly public funds, leading many students to prolong their studies (Laporte and
Ringold 1997).
The analysis in this paper, based on the fiscal and regional characteristics of the Russian
Federation, is similar in spirit to that reported in Fernandez and Rogerson (1997) and
Poterba (1996). They use a panel data set for the fifty states in the US to examine the
effects of demographics (Poterba 1996) and growth in income and students (Fernandez
and Rogerson 1997) on public education spending.
The necessity of reforming the education system in Russia is now generally
acknowledged. The current discussion among policy makers is, therefore, evolving
around the particular nature of reform, such as, finding alternative off-budget ways to
finance education. Irrespective of the scheme proposed, the reaction of economic agents
would depend upon their preferences over education spending, or alternatively, the
‘demand’ for education spending which can be predicted using the income and price
elasticity of demand for education expenditures. The value of this elasticity would affect
forecasts of education spending. The paper, therefore, estimates this elasticity. In their
evaluation of California’s education finance reform, Fernandez and Rogerson (1995)
show that predictions for the change in total spending can vary by as much as 40 per
cent depending upon income and price elasticity.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section we provide a brief background on
the Russian educational system, highlighting the characteristics most important to our
estimation strategy. The model and data sources are presented in Section 3; while the
estimation results are discussed in Section 4. Section 5 reports the calculation of price
elasticity. The paper ends with concluding remarks in Section 6.
32 State of general education3
The Russian Federation inherited a fairly well-developed and mature educational system
from the former Soviet Union. During the Soviet-era, most school age children had
access to general education, and literacy was almost universal. Enrollment rates,
especially those for pre-school and basic education equaled or exceeded those in the
Western developed countries (Laporte and Ringold 1997). However, the transition to a
market economy exposed certain weaknesses in the education system, which was
tailored to the needs of a centrally planned economy. As education was directed toward
the productive and ideological goals of the socialist regime, its ability to respond to
changing economic structures and employment patterns essential for the success of a
market economy was limited.
With a view to bringing greater efficiency and accountability to the education system, a
large part of the education sector was decentralized under the 1992 Law on Education
(Russian Federation 1995). Under this law, the responsibility for general education and
school finance has been entrusted to the regional (oblast) and local (rayon) level
authorities. However, the regions share a certain ambiguous joint responsibility with the
federal government for education spending along with health, social policy, and
economic subsidy. The federal government participates in the financing of the education
sector through unconditional federal transfers. Although most regions have benefited
from such transfers, fiscal relations between the federation and the regions remain
unclear, responsibilities overlap, and financing is inefficient (World Bank 1995).4
The financial transfers from the federal to the regional government have recently
decreased both in absolute terms and relative to what the regions themselves spent.
Fluctuating between 3.4 and 4.5 per cent of GDP, public expenditures on education has
also fallen during the 1990s (Fretwell and Wheeler 2001). This declining trend has been
one of the major problems facing the education sector in Russia. While the gradual
decrease in funding was typical for the last two decades, the transition related reductions
in real expenditures have greatly aggravated the situation (Human Development Report
1995).5
In real terms, public spending on education fell at a rate of about 6 per cent per year. For
instance, in 1998 consolidated public education expenditures accounted for 3.6 per cent
of GDP, compared to about 5.5 per cent in OECD countries (World Bank 2001). The
consolidated budget for education amounted to 189 billion Rubles (3.2 per cent of GDP)
3 For a more detail discussion on the education system in Russia and other related issues, see, among
others, Russian Federation (1995) and OECD (1997).
4 The decentralization of school finance and school administration under the new legislation led to
further differentiation of available resources across and within regions. Sixteen of the country’s 88
regions now spend more than one-third more per student in compulsory education than do the
eighteen regions at the bottom of spending on schools (authors’ calculation).
5 The proportion of GDP Russia allocates to education has declined from 7 per cent in 1970 to around
3.4 per cent in 1992. The figure has fluctuated in the 3–4 per cent range during the last decade.
Comparative international figures include the United States, which allocates 5.5 per cent; France, 5.4
per cent; and the United Kingdom, 5.3 per cent (World Bank 1995). Figures for 1998/99 for other
regions range from a low of 2.5 per cent in South Asia to a high of 5.8 per cent in the Middle East and
North Africa (Dabla-Norris and Matovu 2002, Table 6).
4in 2000. About 18 per cent of this budget had been spent at the federal level while the
remaining amount was divided between the regional and municipal level.6
In the course of the transition process, the size and diversity of Russia, reinforced by
increasing decentralization of government, led to growing regional inequality as well as
inequality of access to education. A number of regions have been able to capitalize on
their resource endowments, location and other factors to increase per capita income
relative to the rest. These regions with high per capita incomes have been able to spend
more on education and other social areas. This variation in endowments and expenditure
composition will enable us to estimate the differential impact of the demand function
for education and the related income and price elasticity.
Given the extent of its territory, the extreme climate and dispersed population, the
federal structure of government, and the ongoing transition from a planned to a market
economy with resulting acute financial constraint, Russia faces a particularly difficult
task in adapting and updating its general education system to meet emerging need. In
this context, it would be quite informative for the policy makers to know what factors
influence the expenditures on education. A proper understanding of these factors would
help in formulating policies conducive to the transition process. This provides a
rationale for the model that will be developed in the next section.
3 Model specification and data sources
The demand function for public goods is analyzed within a median voter framework as
given in Meltzer and Richard (1981). Given the variation of regional data across the
Russian Federation, we can estimate the parameters of the demand function based on
the observations. In the model, the median voter decides on budget shares for particular
types of public good. Although the distribution of income across the regions is different,
we assume that there is no correlation between the median voter’s income and his
preferences for particular types of public goods. He has the same demand function
irrespective of his position in the income scale and his decision on the composition of
public service is based on the size of the public budget.
Earlier studies on educational expenditures have used cross section analysis, using
either individual survey data or data for a sample of school districts.7 However,
Fernandez and Rogerson (1997) have argued that time series relationships in the data
can provide useful complementary information. Following their suggestion, we perform
a panel analysis with the cross section and time series pooling data from 88 regions in
the Russian Federation over the calendar year 1999–2000. The sample period is
constrained by the availability of consistent data series for all the variables considered
in this model. The basic specification of the model that will be used in the paper is given
by:
6 In 2000, about 60 per cent of the federal budget share of educational expenditures went to higher
education. On the other hand, the major share of the regional budget went into general education (61
per cent), followed by primary education (18 per cent) and vocational training (6 per cent).
7 See Bergstrom et al. (1982) for a detail literature survey on this issue.
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where yit represents education expenditures8 in region i in period t, xit represents budget
revenues in region i in period t, and zkit are the remaining k independent variables. The
constant term is a , c represents the region specific variable, and uit is assumed to be a
random error with zero mean.
The dependent variable is measured as the spatial and inflation-adjusted per capita
educational expenditures (CPEDEXP). Total budget revenue is also measured in spatial
and inflation-adjusted per capita form (CPREV). Among the other variables, the
student-population ratio (STUDPPOP) represents the number of pupils per thousand
inhabitants enrolled in secondary schools in 1999–2000 school year. This variable is a
reasonable proxy for the education benefit incidence for region i.9 Population density
per square kilometer is represented by the variable (PDENC). Following Goskomtat,
geographical differences across regions are captured in the model by sub-dividing the
regions into eleven groups, R1…R11. As the logarithm of CPEDEXP, CPREV, and
PDENC are used in the model, the estimated parameters corresponding to these
variables give the elasticity properties of education demand.10
Our empirical analysis takes into account differences among the regions and changes
over time. In doing so, we combine our data cross section and over time in one single
model. Such procedure increases the variation of the data and improves available
degrees of freedom to achieve efficient parameter estimates. It also helps to take
regional effects into consideration.
Data for the 88 regions have been collected for the calender years 1999 and 2000 giving
a total of 176 observations for each variable. The short period of time is unfortunate but
cannot be avoided when researching economies in transition. Moreover, in case of
Russia, the currency crisis of 1998 significantly affected the data for that year. So care
was taken to avoid figures for 1998. Data on total revenue, expenditures on education
and federal fiscal grants11 are taken from the Ministry of Finance of the Russian
Federation12. The regional price index is constructed by the Russian State Statistical
8 Estimation of the demand function requires the quantity of goods consumed. Since reliable data on
quantity of educational output is not available, education expenditures are used as a proxy. Here,
education expenditures (yi) can be expressed as the product of units of education consumed (qi) and price
of the unit (pi), i.e., yi = qi * pi. Assuming that the price of one unit of education is unity, education
expenditures is a proxy for quantity, yi = qi.
9 Schultz (1996) has used a similar variable and has shown that the number of school-aged children as a
share of total population has varied widely over time due to the demographic transition in low-income
countries and the baby-boom in high-income countries.
10 Other functional forms, such as simple linear specification were also examined. The best results were
obtained with log specification.
11 The grant consists of two budgetary items – direct transfers and mutual settlements.
12 Since the general education is mostly financed through the regional budgets, we used the regional fiscal
data, without considering federal budget expenditures on the education.
6Agency (Goskomtat) and is calculated on the basis of a basket of 25 items. The 2000
GDP Inflation index for the Russian Federation is used to adjust the 1999 data to 2000.
The figure is taken from the Bureau of Economic Analysis, Moscow. The data on
population, demographic structure, and regional subdivision into ‘geographical rayons’
are also taken from Goskomstat. Summary statistics for the variables are given in the
Appendix in Table A1.
4 Estimation results
Given the nature of the data, we expect individual region-specific heterogeneity to exist
within the model. Regions are likely to systematically vary in terms of weather,
infrastructure, productive efficiencies, income, etc. Consequently, the use of standard
least square methods – which ignore such differences – would lead to biased estimates.
Moreover, the direction of the bias cannot be identified a priori. An alternative choice
would be the use of a panel data analysis.
In order to capture the cross-sectional parameter heterogeneity, two types of models are
generally proposed in the literature. The random effect model, treats the region-specific
variables as time-invariant random variables, which are independent of the explanatory
variables of the model. The fixed effects model (the within, or least squares dummy
variable estimator), on the other hand, allows individual effects to be correlated with the
regressors. Results of different estimates can vary substantially if the time period (T)
analyzed is small and the cross-sectional units (N) are large.
The choice of the model can be based solely upon a priori assumptions. The test of our
panel data set for unobserved effect (Breusch-Pagan Lagrangian multiplier effect) show
that the individual effect exists and this supports the use of panel estimation, rather than
pooled GLS method.13 Next, the possibility of applying the more efficient random
effects model against the fixed effects model is checked using the Hausman chi-squared
statistic. The test examines the correlation between the region-specific effects and the
explanatory variables. In the presence of the correlation, fixed effects estimator is
consistent while the random effects estimator is biased.14 Failure to reject the null
hypothesis of no correlation would, however, lead us to the adoption of the random
effects model.
The panel regression results are shown in Table 1. Estimations have been carried out
using the GLS random effect procedure as given in the STATA statistical package. The
model indicates a good fit with the data, explaining about 91 per cent of the variation in
educational expenditures across regions. Three specification tests are reported in the
table. First, the Breusch-Pagan Langrange Multiplier test is used to test the statistical
significance of the regional random effects. The null hypothesis is that the variance of
the region-specific error component is equal to zero, that it, Var(u) = 0. The test
statistic, calculated from the OLS residual of the panel regression has a chi-square
distribution with one degree of freedom. The calculated test statistic of 30.92
comfortably rejects the null hypothesis of zero variance at the 1 per cent significance
level. This indicates that the region spesific effects are statistically significant.
13 The specific results are discussed later.
14 See Love and Turner (2001) on this issue.
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Results from panel data estimation using the GLS random effects model
Dependent variable: Per capita education expenditures (CPEDEXP)
Coefficient
Variable Estimate z-statistic P>abs. Z
Constant 1.861 7.57 0.000
Ln(CPREV) 0.561 22.00 0.000
STUDPPOP 0.003 4.42 0.000
Ln(PDENC) -0.041 -4.49 0.000
R1 0.166 2.93 0.003
R7 -0.122 -2.42 0.015
R8 0.105 2.16 0.031
Adj. R-square 0.92
Number of observations 174
Wald Test [chi-square(6)] 948.13
Prob>chi-square 0.000
Breusch-Pagan Lagrange Multiplier test:
Null Hypotheses: Var(u)=0
Calculated Chi-square(1) = 30.92
Prob>chi-square = 0.000
Hausman Specification test:
Null Hypothesis: No systematic difference in coefficients
Calculated Chi-square(1) = 0.00
Prob>chi-square = 0.989
Note: The variables CPEDEXP, CPREV, STUDPPOP, and PDENC represent per capita educational
expenditures, total tax revenue, student-population ratio, and population density, respectively.
R1, R7, and R8 are the three regional variables. Ln represents the logarithm of the variables.
Second, we test the orthogonality of the region-specific error component u with the
explanatory variables, a condition that is necessary for avoiding inconsistency that can
result from omitted variables in the random effects specification. As discussed earlier,
the Hausman correlation test is used for this purpose. Under the null hypothesis of zero
correlation between the error term and the regressors, the test statistic is asymptotically
distributed as chi-squared with the degrees of freedom equal to the number of
regressors. The calculated test statistic do not reject the null hypothesis of orthogonality
at the one per cent significance level. This justifies the use of the random rather than the
fixed effects model. Finally, given that only the asymptotic properties of the random-
effect estimators are known, a chi-square statistic, instead of an F-statistic, is reported
for the overall significance of the coefficient. Considered jointly, the calculated chi-
square value show that the coefficients are significant.
Now let us turn our attention to the coefficient estimates. The coefficient of per capita
revenue, which is used as a proxy for income, is positive and highly significant. As the
decision of the median voter in our model is constrained by the budget, the coefficient
estimate indicates that regions with higher income tend to attract higher education
expenditures. The numerical value of 0.56 shows that a one per cent change in per
capita budget revenue (CPREV) changes per capita education expenditures (CPEDEXP)
8by 0.56 per cent. Given the logarithmic form of the function, this measures the income
elasticity of the demand for education and confirms that education is a normal good in
Russia. We can consider the elasticity value as a mixed blessing. On one hand, it is
quite low suggesting that Russian households consider education expenditures to be a
necessity. A high income elasticity, on the other hand, would have indicated that
education expenditures is a luxury. The elasticity figure lies within the range of income
elasticity reported for other countries.15
However, from a policy perspective, the elasticity figure may be a source of concern.
Policy makers cannot depend upon general increases in income to lead to higher
expenditures on education. For every doubling of income, the budget share spent on
education increased by about a half. Combined with the finding, discussed later in this
section, that the level of expenditures on education vary significantly by income level in
different regions, the results show the need for specific policy tools in order to address
the inability of poorer regions to incur additional expenditures. This is similar to the
findings for Peru as reported in World Bank (2001).
The ratio of student to population also has a significant positive impact on educational
expenditures. Evaluated at the mean value, the coefficient estimate indicates that an
increase in the average ratio of student to population by one percentage point leads to an
almost one-half of one percentage point increase in educational spending. Interestingly,
this result for the Russian regions is contrary to those reported for the US states in
Poterba (1996) and Fernandez and Rogerson (1997). Both these studies found that
increasing the fraction of the population of school age has little effect on education
spending.16 Our findings, if they in fact reflect tensions between generations in the
allocation of funds, suggest that the changing demographic profile of the Russian
Federation may lead to long-term increase in the level of government financing of
general education.
Population density has a negative impact on total educational expenditures. High
population density enables regional governments to reduce the cost of educational
service provided because of the developed infrastructure and/or economies of scale.
The results show that regional location is another important factor in explaining the
behavior of educational expenditures. Models are initially estimated using eleven
regional variables. However, only three turn out to be statistically significant. The
remaining eight insignificant regional variables are, therefore, dropped and the model
reestimated. The three regions that significantly affected the dependent variable are
located in geographical areas that possess particular properties which influences
expenditures on education.
The regions of European North (R1) probably have, on average, a more severe climate
than other regions. The positive sign associated with this variable indicates that this
region attracts more government money for providing educational services. The positive
15 Recent estimates for income elasticity range from a low of 0.27 in Peru (World Bank 2001) to a high
of 0.73 in Kenya (Mwabu 1994). However, Schultz (1996) reports an income elasticity of greater than
one in a panel estimate from sixty countries.
16 In a related study, Figlio (1997) also reports evidence that schools operating under government
restrictions had a higher student-teacher ratio but lower spending levels than the unrestricted schools.
9sign for the Ural region (R8) can be explained by the high industrial development that
has taken place in this region and the resulting high demand function for education. The
variable R7 represents the North Caucasus region and the negative sign for this variable
reinforces the proposition that in highly populated regions, local educational
expenditures can lead to future migration of students. Anticipating such a process, the
results indicate that the region is not interested in higher spending on education. The
findings can also be attributed to the dominance of agriculture in the local economy and
the favourable climate which helps the regional authorities to save money by reducing
utility expenses on buildings.
5 Price elasticity estimation
In the previous section, we assumed that prices for public goods in real terms17 are the
same across regions. In this section, we will estimate the price elasticity of demand for
public expenditures on education. In order to estimate price elasticity, it is useful to
think of regional budgets in the context of an inter-budget fiscal framework. The idea
being that federal government transfers decrease the cost of providing public service to
the taxpayers. Each ruble spent on public goods is partially paid by the federal
government through the transfers from central resources to regional budgets.
Under this framework, the pivotal voter disposes of his own income, Ci, and the
regional per capita government revenue, Ri , so he can consume the valueWi
Wi = Ci + R i
When the region i obtains the transfer, the total budget constraint for the voter within
the jurisdiction is given by:
Wi = Ci + Ri + Gi
where Gi is the amount of per capita federal transfer for the region.
If the decisive voter can convert lump-sum grants into private income through tax
reduction as well as an increase in both private and public consumption due to a
relaxation of budget constraint, the expenditure effect of federal grants could be
measured only by the income effect. But due either to fiscal illusions or political
reasons, the taxpayer cannot successfully transform the public money into private
consumption. Under this scenario, a flypaper effect can be observed.18 Now the
expenditure effect of the federal transfers would not only be from the income effect, but
also from the price-substitution effect between public and private goods. The lump-sum
grant generates a price effect that is usually associated with the matching grant.
17 Spatial price adjustment was made for all fiscal figures.
18 The flypaper effect shows that public income is disproportionately spent on private consumption
while a federal grant is primarily spent on public services. Knight (2000) reports that empirical
research in the United States has found that state government public spending in increased far more,
often dollar-for-dollar, by federal grant receipts than by equivalent increases in the level of private
income of the constituents.
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Table 2
Estimation of price elasticity
Dependent variable: Per capita education expenditures (CPEDEXP)
Variable Estimate z-statistic Prob>abs. z
Constant 1.863 7.16 0.000
Ln(CPREVW) 0.561 19.73 0.000
Ln(RREV) -0.470 -7.49 0.000
STUDPPOP 0.004 3.87 0.000
Ln(PDENC) -0.055 -5.93 0.000
Adj. R-square 0.90
Number of observations 176
Wald test [chi-square(4)] 829.72
Prob>chi-square 0.000
Breusch-Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test:
Null Hypothesis: Var(u) = 0
Calculated Chi-square(1) = 36.19
Prob>chi-square = 0.000
Hausman specification test:
Null Hypothesis: No systematic differences in coefficients
Calculated Chi-square(2) = 1.57
Prob>chi-square = 0.457
Note: CPREVW measures per capita revenue without federal grants. For a description of the other
variables, see notes to Table 1.
The decision of the median voter on the size and composition of public spending is now
based upon the price of the public good subsidized by the federal government through
the transfer. The net price which the average taxpayer in the jurisdiction i faces is given
by
p = Ri/(Ri + Gi)
where p is the net price.
Under this framework, the federal transfers to regional budgets alter the price for public
education relative to that of private goods. Therefore, we can capture the price
difference given the variation in the size of federal transfers and own budgets over
different regions of the Russian Federation. In the model, rather than the total budget
revenue, we use own budget revenue (the revenue collected by the regional
government) of the jurisdiction i as a proxy for income. The plausible logarithmic
demand function to estimate price elasticity would thus be:
itiitkitpitit uczpexey +++++= 
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itx own regional per capita budget revenue
itp price for public education
ity per capita education expenditures
e income elasticity
pe price elasticity
ic region specific effect
The equation is estimated by panel data random effects model. The results are given in
Table 2. The robustness of this particular panel estimation is examined using a battery
of tests including the Hausman specification test, Breusch-Pagan Lagrangian Multiplier
test and the Wald chi-square test. Results from all these tests, reported in Table 2, show
that the random effects model estimated in this table is appropriate and efficient. The
R-square of about 0.90 is quite high for panel data. The coefficient of the RREV
variable measures the price elasticity of the demand for education. The coefficient is
statistically significant and of the anticipated negative sign, suggesting a substitution
effect. The numerical value shows a price elasticity of –0.47. Thus an inelastic price
elasticity of education is evident in Russia. This finding is similar to the price elasticity
of –0.39 as reported in Chandler (2001) for the Connecticut school system.19
6 Conclusion
Economic growth and the development of a civil society during transition depend upon
the capacity of well-educated workers and citizens to respond to changing economic
conditions. Education has emerged as an essential component of the transition to a
market economy. The Russian Federation is no exception. Education financing in
Russia is undergoing reform on a number of fronts. On one hand, it is becoming multi-
level and multi-channel; while on the other hand, normative specifications and personal
financing decisions are dominating discussion in the public policy arena. In this context,
an exercise in determining the factors that influence public education expenditures is not
only informative but also essential in understanding the reform process that underlies a
successful transition in the education sector.
The paper uses panel data to estimate the determinants of education expenditures.
Results show that revenue and the student-population ratio have a positive impact on
education expenditures while the effect of population density is negative. Three regional
variables also show significant impact. The income elasticity of education expenditures
is estimated to be 0.56 and is comparable to studies from other countries. The paper also
estimates the price elasticity that turns out to be –0.47 indicating an inelastic demand.
19 Previous estimates of tax-price elasticity for median-voter models of the effects of grants-in-aid to
school districts in the United States ranged between –0.09 and –0.34 (Chandler 2001).
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Recent studies suggest that the allocation of expenditures in education matters for
growth. Public education spending in many transition economies, however, is often
inefficient and inequitable with education outlays misallocated across sectors. This
highlights the need for an assessment of the nature of education expenditures in these
countries. This paper attempts to fill the gap in the literature in this area.
The results presented here raise, but do not resolve, questions about how fiscal
institutions and the structure of the political process in Russia may affect the degree of
resource allocation in the educational sector during the transition process. It will be
interesting to see how both the people and the policy makers in the Russian Federation
respond to this daunting task in the near future.
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Appendix
Table A1
Summary statistics of the variables
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Units
rev99 88 7 238 043 11 400 000 208 781 87 700 000 th rub
revw99 88 6 468 615 11 400 000 29 767 87 700 000 th rub
edexp99 88 1 414 195 1 489 510 55 398 9 480 594 th rub
rev00 88 11 800 000 24 000 000 377 581 196 000 000 th rub
revw00 88 10 600 000 24 100 000 59 773 196 000 000 th rub
edexp00 88 1 964 396 2 216 296 92 276 14 200 000 th rub
gks_index 88 1.10 0.39 0.77 3.25
PDENC 88 161 975 0.02 8589 persons/km2
POP 88 1626 1470 19 8537 th people
STUDPPOP 88 158 24 120 236 per 1000
